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Abstract
Blogs differ from other media in that authors are usually not remunerated and inscribe
themselves in communities of similarly minded individuals. Bloggers value reciprocal atten-
tion, interaction with other bloggers and information from reading other blogs; they value
being read but also writing itself, irrespective of an audience. A novel dataset from a major
blogging community, LiveJournal, is used to verify predictions from a model of social net-
working. Content production and blogging activity are found to be related to the size and
degree of asymmetry of the relational networks in which bloggers are inscribed.
JEL Classifications: D63, D85, H41, L17, L82, L86, Z13
Keywords: Blog; Internet; Media; Community; Social Network; Reciprocity; LiveJour-
nal; Web 2.0.
This paper models the behavior of bloggers, a specific type of producers of media content on
the Internet. Such content consists mainly of entries, or short articles, published in blogs. Blogs
are websites which are either individually or collectively maintained and deal in a variety of
topics, ranging from the most mundane to the political, scientific or cultural. Entries are usually
rather short, frequent and arranged chronologically. Blogs feature many links with a number
of other websites, and they are widely read by and engaged with by the Internet community.
Bloggers spend considerable time interacting with their readers, mainly other bloggers. They
also read the entries of other bloggers, with whom they establish relations maintained over long
periods of time.
Blogs differ from other media as their authors are usually not remunerated and inscribe them-
selves in communities of similarly minded bloggers. There is little hierarchy and no clear distinc-
tion between writers and readers, i.e. between producers and consumers of information. Blogging
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exhibits the same type of peer group relationships as those found in non virtual worlds, through
links between individual weblogs which result in the creation of lively networks.
Bloggers respond to a mix of different motivations; they value interaction with other bloggers
and information from reading other blogs. They value being read but they also value writing
itself, irrespective of an audience.
The aim of this paper is to determine how a mix of agents with different motivations exchange
reciprocal attention, and to measure the relative importance of different motivations in taking part
in the newly emergent networks of ‘blogs’. In doing so, the paper exploits a unique and novel
dataset from the LiveJournal blogging community.
This paper thus devotes its attention to the moral codes, motivations and interactions of online
participants into blogging networks. For example, if bloggers care primarily about expressing
themselves, then their activity will not depend on the number in their audience. If instead blog-
gers care primarily about building relations with their readers and those they read, then there will
be a fine balance between how much attention a blogger gets and the attention that she devotes to
other bloggers.
This paper produces important insights into the motivational dynamics of this new pub-
lic sphere (the ‘blogosphere’) and furthers the understanding of the motivations for participa-
tion in Internet-mediated non-monetary transactions. This is important because blogs and other
community-led endeavors (Wikis, open source software) challenge the usual top-down approach
of old industries, and make it easier for dispersed contributions to have a global impact without
central coordination. The conclusions from the paper are relevant to those companies that manage
blogging and social networking communities, such as Google’s Blogger, Six Apart’s Typepad,
SUP’s LiveJournal, Wordpress, Facebook, or News Corp’s MySpace). This work is of interest
to the media industry in general as it contributes to the study of a new source of expression and
news. This work is also relevant to those companies that are involved in the management of
communities of self-motivated individuals, such as eBay or Amazon with their networks of in-
dependent sellers and buyers. Finally, this study matters to those companies that want to involve
their clients and employees in a more open way though the medium of blogs.
1 Background
Nowadays, individuals make extensive use of the Internet and release large amounts of informa-
tion on the Web. They often do so through the medium of weblogs. A weblog, often referred
to as a blog, is a personal journal arranged in reverse chronological order (from the most recent
post to the oldest post) and made publicly accessible on the web, and characteristically updated
on a daily basis. Blogs are now accessible to a large population, thanks to the availability of
user-friendly tools for their updating. Statistics on blogs, however, are notoriously fickle (Bialik,
2005). Henning (2005) estimated the number of blogs at 53 million by the end of 2005 (see figure
4 in appendix B), and Technorati, an Internet search engine for blogs, claimed to track about 113
2
million blogs in May 2008. Perseus Development Corporation (2004) estimates that about one
third of them are active. Age and gender characteristics of bloggers vary according to reports
(Rainie, 2005), but most agree that weblog authors are dominated by youth while all genders are
represented (Huffaker, 2004; Huffaker and Calvert, 2005).
Weblogs have many possible formats and can be classified according to their content and pur-
pose. In general, we can divide weblogs into two distinct groups: personal and ‘topic-oriented’
weblogs (Herring et al., 2004). The former type relates to people’s expression of opinion, ideas
and emotions whereas the purpose of the later is to convey expert information on a specific topic,
generally in the area of professional expertise of the blogger herself. Blogging is thus a form of
leisure but also of economic, political and social action.
A number of views have been expressed about the role, value and future of blogs and bloggers.
Some consider them as a newly emergent media form (Ribstein, 2005, 2006), leading Lemann
(2006) to question its value to journalism. Others (Drezner and Farrell, 2008) consider blogs as
a tool of political influence, leading Sunstein (2008) to ask what kind of public space is being
created within this new media and to worry about how blogs may polarize opinions. Quiggin
(2006) considers blogs as part of the ‘creative commons’ with Wikis and open source software,
while Huck et al. (2008) are interested in how blogs help consumer choice and affect firms’
reputations. Finally, others consider blogs simply as a tool for social networking, the online
equivalent of networks of friends, relatives and acquaintances (Paolillo et al., 2005).
2 Related Literature
The focus of this paper is to analyse the occurrence, strength and significance of reciprocal (non-
directed) or non-reciprocal (directed) links between agents in a network. In particular, this study
aims to investigate the trade-off between attention given and content produced by bloggers. As
noted by Drezner and Farrell (2008), blogs are ‘a major topic for research’ and offer ‘extraor-
dinarily fertile terrain for the social sciences’. Here, we adopt the view expressed in Bruni and
Sugden (2008) that economics is not only concerned with market interactions, but also with the
wider class of reciprocal relationships in civil society, which justifies applying an economic anal-
ysis to the study of blogging.
This paper is one of comparatively few that use statistical analysis on weblogs. Ribstein
(2005) and Lassica (2001) have good introductions to the use, function and role of blogs and
can serve as starting points to this literature. Furukawa et al. (2006) focuses on the analysis of
relationships between weblogs and the effects of those relationships on the reading behavior of
weblog authors in a weblog network. Bachnik et al. (2005) looks at weblog networks and the
existence of social structures in those networks. Bar-Ilan (2005) monitored a set of weblogs
and analyzed their content in order to determine the reason why people wrote and read weblogs.
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Paolillo et al. (2005) used data from LiveJournal, the blog host, to correlate the change in Live-
Journal users’ interests and the change in their friends’ networks. Kumar et al. (2004) is another
researcher trying to relate cross-linking patterns by exploring the list of interests of bloggers on
LiveJournal.
While there is some amount of research into the structural patterns of blogging relationships
online (Backstrom et al., 2006; Bachnik et al., 2005; Finin et al., 2005), there is little quantitative
or theoretical research linking social structure, activity and motivation of bloggers (Kumar et al.,
2004; Furukawa et al., 2006; Lento et al., 2006; Mishne and Glance, 2006).
Qualitative studies of bloggers’ motivations (Raynes-Goldie, 2004; Fono and Raynes-Goldie,
2006) reveal bloggers are interested in producing their own content and opinions on current
events, interacting with other bloggers and generating debate on their own opinions, as well
as in joining communities of shared interests. Other papers distinguish between different types
of bloggers by their position in a network and determine how this influences their activity. They
differentiate between agents that are central or peripheral (Caffarelli, 2004), readers or writers,
community or self-oriented, magnetic or unattractive (Brueckner, 2006).
This paper complements the existing literature on blogging with a different — network struc-
tural — economic perspective. The analysis of social networks draws from a long tradition in
sociology and has recently also become a subject of study for economists (Watts, 2001; Jackson,
2003; Newman, 2003; Gui and Sugden, 2005; Brueckner, 2006). This paper uses existing models
of network structure and formation of links among individuals (see Jackson (2003) and Newman
(2003) for Internet applications). We are interested in the activity – content production – of each
node – agent – and explore the relation between network structure and production in small net-
works. As seen in Jackson (2003), the literature on directed networks is still rather undeveloped.
The issue of whether links are reciprocated or not, and the related issue of the strength of rela-
tionships in a network, is an area of study that is little explored (on weak vs. strong relations, see
(Granovetter, 1973)). Most models assume relations are reciprocal and do not set out to deter-
mine the intensity of the relation between agents. This paper differs from those by measuring not
only the number of links that each agent maintains, but also the intensity of the activity of each
agent. This allows us to use devised proxies for the intensity of relations among bloggers.
The paper is thus unique in exploiting measures of a blogger’s network size and composition
with measures of the type and extent of his or her activities. The structure of the links connecting
bloggers and the activity of each bloggers is drawn from a major blog hosting site, LiveJournal.
Blogging activity is measured in various ways, for example: number of entries, number of links
back to other weblogs, number of references to other blogger entries, number of comments made
on other weblogs, etc. We show that bloggers attempt to balance attention received and attention
given within their network. However, they are also ready to sacrifice attention received from a
blogger if that blogger provided sufficient content. This study shows that one can obtain good
results by distinguishing the act of reciprocation of friendship, and acts that are designed to attract
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readership.
Beyond works on blogging and network theory, this article is also of interest to behavioral
economics in that sustained participation in blog networks requires bloggers to adhere to norms
of reciprocity. It is also of interest to innovation economics as Weblogs change the dynamics of
knowledge production and information exchange in a way that can be likened to how open-source
methods change the way software and information infrastructures are developed and maintained
(von Hippel, 1998). Users become participants in the development and management of the prod-
ucts they use (Quiggin, 2006). The micro-economic analysis of activity in blog network presented
in this paper throws light on the details of the motivational structure for such activities. Finally,
this paper is also of direct interest to the blogging and media world, and especially to those blog-
gers who are theorising on their own activities (Blood, 2000; Fono and Raynes-Goldie, 2006;
Herring et al., 2004; Huffaker and Calvert, 2005; Raynes-Goldie, 2004; Ribstein, 2005, 2006).
Public interest has been focused on the few atypical blogs that have achieved an audience that
goes far beyond the world of blogging, such as for example the politically influential Huffington
Post or Belle de Jour’s blog, which was made into books and a TV series.
We argue that the model set out in this paper is better adapted to describe the majority of
blogs, as these are part of a self-sustaining economy which does not require any exchange of
money or other goods. Bloggers are integrated into tightly knit communities of like-minded indi-
viduals, who devote continued attention to each other. This imposes a limit to the size of anyone’s
audience: a blogger with many friends will not be able to devote much attention to each of them
and will at some point have to limit the size of his/her network if he/she is to sustain relationship
with its readers. In particular, this view is suited to the study of the LiveJournal community of
bloggers, with its unique and sophisticated federating system. Regarding competition with other
media, it would be difficult in our view for any one blog to emerge as a significant competitor
to any one journal or other media. On one hand, blogging that is organised in communities con-
tributes to audience fragmentation, as each group of bloggers concentrate on interests specific to
that group. On the other hand, this type of blogging encourages the production of a diversity of
views, as any type of views is able to federate an audience in a community of bloggers.
3 The Model
We ground the analysis on formal models such as Domon (2001) or Brueckner (2006). In those
models, a value function for each agent belonging to the network is determined as a function of
the number of their links with other bloggers, and whether those are reciprocated or not. The
utility of one agent depends not only on whom they are linked to, but also on the links of those
other agents with other agents.
Consider a simple model where N agents produce their own content and read content gen-
erated by others in the network. e = (e1,e2, ...,eN) denotes the vector of effort into producing
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content by agents 1, 2, ..., N and n = (ni j)i6= j denotes the vector of attentions, that is, for exam-
ple, agent i devotes attention ni j to the content produced by j 6= i.
A simple additive form for the total utility of a representative agent, i in this instance, is
(1) Ui(n,e) = λi∑
j 6=i
n jiei︸ ︷︷ ︸
Utility from being read
+ ∑
j 6=i
ni je j︸ ︷︷ ︸
Utility from reading others
with λi ≥ 0. λi measures the propensity to enjoy being read compared to the propensity to enjoy
reading others (normalized to 1 here). We do not consider the cost to reading others or producing
content (see appendix E for a full model where such costs are considered).
In the following, we will establish the existence of a ‘norm of reciprocity’, whereby an agent
that devotes less attention to others than others devote to her will produce more content than
others, while an agent that devotes more attention to others than others devote to her will produce
less content than others.
Consider a competitive market for attention, where an agent i has the choice between estab-
lishing a link with an agent j or an agent k. Agent i will prefer establishing the link with j if
the net gain in utility from doing so, λn jiei + ni je j (the first part is what is gained from being
read by j, the second is what is gained by reading j), is more than the net gain in utility from
establishing a link with k, λnkiei+nikek.1 In such a competitive market, the surplus from creating
links should be the same across all agents — indeed, if that was not the case, then some agents
who offer lower surplus would lose friends and ultimately be left out of the market, while those
that offer more would accumulate friends at the expense of others. Therefore, it must be that both
surplus are equal, so that
(2) λn jiei +ni je j = λnkiei +nikek
which can be rewritten as
(3) λ (nki−n ji)ei = ni je j−nikek
In general, the level of attention displayed individually to each agent in a network is unob-
servable. It is also generally the case that, when an agent friends another, she does not know
how much attention she will receive, and if this is more or less than what other friends receive.
Therefore, one must assume in most cases that, a priori, agent i will devote the same attention to
both j and k if both are listed as friend by i, so ni j = nik. This is true if, for example, i cannot
apportion attention individually and must thus devotes equal attention to all his friends.2
The interpretation of the formula of equation (3) can then be divided in two parts, one consid-
ering the situation where a friendship is reciprocated, the other the situation when the friendship
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is not reciprocated.
1. Suppose i reciprocates friendship from both j and k so that a priori, ni j = nik. Suppose that
e j > ek (agent j offers more or better content or interactions), then, from formula (3), I
must have nki > n ji : agent k, who produces less, must devote more attention to i than agent
j, who produces more, does. In other terms, assuming again that agents cannot apportion
attention individually and thus devote equal attention to all their friends, then agent k must
have a lower number of friends than j.
This allows us to define a norm of reciprocity as follows: an agent that offers little content
compared to others in a network will have to compensate this by devoting more attention
to those others if she is to maintain her place in the network. Conversely, an agent that
offers a lot of content compared to others in a network will be able to devote less attention
to those others and still maintain her place in the network.
Such a norm of reciprocity will occur naturally as a result of the competitive equilibrium
in a market where reciprocal attention is being exchanged. Agents will not build or sustain
links that are not reciprocal. The norm of reciprocity may also emerge not through a
competitive process, but from an innate sense of ‘justice’, or because agents consider it
is a ‘desirable’ norm of behavior that is to be encouraged in the setting in which the agents
operate.
2. Note that reciprocity in this instance is defined not as reciprocity in attention or in content,
but as reciprocity in net surplus. Under that norm, an agent may accept getting less attention
from an agent with more content. Agents trade attention for content and vice versa. One
could observe other forms of reciprocity, whereby agents would for example only link
with agents that have the same number of friends as they have so as to ensure a balance
of attention, or will only link with agents that display the same level of overall blogging
activity, so as to ensure reciprocal exchange of content. Those other forms of reciprocity
are potentially as valid as the one we consider here. However, those alternative norms do
not have such a power of explanation as the norm of reciprocity we consider here; indeed,
a typical blogger’ reading list will include a variety of more and of less popular blogs, and
among this reading list, some blogs will be more active than others.
3. Whether an agent reciprocate friendships individually is not observable. We only observe
at the aggregate level whether an agent has many friends or not, and whether the agent
has a balance between friends and friend of. However, we can hypothesise that an agent
with many friends compared to the average will have more of his friends having less friends
than himself or herself than the opposite (again, this is not necessarily true but rather likely).
This agent with many friends should therefore according to the norm of reciprocity produce
more than agents with less friends. This leads us to exposing hypothesis 1:
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Hypothesis 1 Bloggers who display higher levels of content production and general blog-
ging activity have a higher number of readers (H1).
H1 would seem quite intuitive, although we show in the full model in appendix E that if
all agents are linked with each other and are identical, then content should be invariant
with the number of friends (an hypothesis we denote H1’, see appendix E). H1 therefore
implicitly assumes asymmetries in the network structure, that is, agents differ in their type
of motivation, do not link exclusively with agents that have the same number of friends
as they have, and do not link exclusively with agents with the same quality or quantity of
content as they have. Appendix E shows indeed that if agents differ in their motivation,
then results similar to those posited in H1 will appear.
4. Consider now the case when at least some friendships are not reciprocated. For example,
suppose one observes an agent who reciprocates only a few of its friendships (high ratio of
friend of to friends). This is a clear case where at least some readers do not see their friend-
ship reciprocated. Suppose i has a choice between friending j who reciprocates friendships
and friending k, who does not, so nki < n ji. Suppose as before that i cannot segregate be-
tween friends so we must have ni j = nik. Then, from formula (3), this means that we must
have ek > e j : an agent that does not reciprocate friendship must be producing more content
than another agent that reciprocates. This leads us to spelling hypothesis 2 as follows:
Hypothesis 2 Bloggers with less friends than readers (who are read by more bloggers
than they read blogs) produce more content than others. Bloggers with more friends than
readers (who read more blogs than other bloggers read them) have less content than others
(H2).
5. Note that as in H1, what we observe (aggregate level of reciprocity) is only an imperfect
signal of individual levels of reciprocity. For example, one might very well have a blogger
with a number of friends equal to his number of ‘friend of’ who sees none of his friends
reciprocate while she reciprocates none of her friendships. This blogger will have an equal
amount of friends than of friends of and will thus appear to reciprocate on aggregate. How-
ever, statistically, those with imbalances between friends and ‘friend of’ are more likely
than others to have imbalances at the individual level, which justifies our spelling out hy-
pothesis 2.
In what follows, we analyse patterns of relationship and content production, exemplified by
the theoretical framework detailed in this section, using real data. Our objective is to identify
relations between network size, structure and content production, and check whether hypothesis
H1 and H2 are verified.
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4 Empirical analysis
The data analysed in this article are collected from LiveJournal (“LJ”), a web-based community
where Internet users can keep a weblog (blog), journal or diary.
LiveJournal, at www.livejournal.com, is a service offering Internet users a fast and easy way
to create blogs. Among blog hosts, LJ distinctive feature is the emphasis on the community aspect
of blogging, in that it is based on an open-source code and is to a great extent maintained and
kept alive by a community of volunteers.3
Created in 1999 by Brad Fitzpatrick, in January 2005 LJ was purchased by SixApart, the
owners of Typepad – another popular blog host. Since the take-over, the profit making aspect
of LJ has become prevalent: “sponsored” (advertising-bearing) accounts have been introduced
and the discrepancy between services offered to free versus paying users has been widening
ever since. In December 2007, Six Apart sold LiveJournal to SUP, a Russian company that
was already managing LJ in Russia. This raised issues regarding the management of LJ’s user
base and communities, notably for those Russian bloggers who feared a crackdown by Russian
authorities. The “privatisation” of LJ was furthered in March 2008, when the option for creating
free accounts was removed. Widespread protests by users led to the option being re-instated in
August 2008.4
In December 2005, the number of accounts (or blogs) recorded by LJ on its publishing system
totaled 9,000,634, of which 1,333,839 (15%) had been updated in the previous 30 days. LJ was
most popular in the United States, where 46% of the total number of users were located, followed
by Canada, Russia and the UK, each with 3% of users.5 As LJ is based on an open-source code,
several LJ “clones” have been established, such as DeadJournal, a blog host aimed at the goth
community.6 These offshoots are not surveyed in our study, as they are not under the same
umbrella as LJ.
This study focuses on LiveJournal because it provides detailed and easily accessible informa-
tion on users’ activity. Other blog hosts do not adopt the same policy of wide transparency, and
the same type of information would be more difficult and costly to access. Information on LJ
users is accessible on the “user information” page, the content of which is described in appendix
A. Some data is provided by default and cannot be hidden by the user: user name, account cre-
ation number, date of creation, status of the account (i.e. early adopter, free, paid, sponsored),
name and number of friends, number of posts, number of comments made and received belong
to this type of information. Other data, such as date of birth, location, list of interests, and any
additional information, is provided on a voluntary basis.7 Other information, such as gender, is
not shown but it is collected by LJ for internal statistical purposes.8
LJ offers users several ways of interacting with other bloggers, namely friend lists and com-
munities. Information on the relational network of a blogger, such as name and number of blog-
gers who list the user as friend and the communities the user is member of, can be hidden.
Alternatively, the blogger can choose to list as friends only those users who list her as friend, and
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hide those for whom she does not return, or reciprocate, the friendship.
4.1 Friends and communities
Much of the analysis in this paper focuses on the lists of friends. This word has different meanings
on LJ (Fono and Raynes-Goldie, 2006). At a technical level, a friend is another blogger the user
subscribes to. Listing someone as a friend is referred to as friending. LJ users list their friends on
friends’ pages; such lists record all entries made by the friends, in reverse chronological order.
Listing another blogger as ‘friend’ implies the user will be following the blogger’s entries over
some period of time. In turn, friends are able to read those entries the user chooses not to make
public (i.e. those entries that are not accessible unless one is logged in LJ and one is listed as a
friend). Not all users choose to make such ‘filtered’ entries, but a large portion restrict access to
at least some of their posts. “Friendship” therefore acquires a meaning that is not present in other
blog networks; in this case means confidence and readiness for closer intimacy. Finally, the term
“friend” carries its usual meaning, i.e. one of liking and positive interest in other users. In this
sense, many LJ friendships reflect “real world” friendships. Others are “LJ-only” friendships,
formed and maintained by reading and posting comments.
Many LJ users attach great significance to the act of ‘friending’, or of dropping other users
from the friend list. Some engage in ‘popularity contests’, whereby status is attached to the
number of users who list you as friend. Some do not welcome unsolicited friendships. The latter
occurs when a user is listed as friend by users she does not wish to be-friending. Options were
made available on LJ to prevent unwanted interaction.
Friendships are generally established with the expectation of reciprocity. This means that a
user expects a friend will read her back in return; it also means that the same user will not friend
someone who is not expected to reciprocate the friendship, and will drop from the list those who
do not reciprocate. The extent to which those norms hold, however, varies from user to user and
from situation to situation, and they are therefore not universally followed. More on LJ and its
social dynamics can be found in Raynes-Goldie (2004).
4.2 The Data
The data used in this study are observations on list of friends, readers, and posting activity of 250
bloggers, which were selected from the LiveJournal blog host using a script that chooses bloggers
at random.9
Table 1 compares features of the randomly selected bloggers to those of LJ, for an informal
check of the representativeness of the sample:10
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Random sample LiveJournal
Weblogs updated in the last
30 days
69% 15%
Weblogs updated in the last 7
days
51% 9%
Weblogs updated in the last
24 hours
28% 3%
Countries US: 48% UK: 12% US: 46% UK: 3%
Russia: 6% Canada: 5% Russia: 3% Canada: 3%
Age (mode) 20-22 years 18 years
Table 1: Comparison table
One can see that bloggers are young, between 20 and 22 years of age, and predominantly
located is the US. The random sample appears to reflect age and location of the wider community,
although several locations appears to be over-represented. The level of activity is higher in the
sample than in LJ. There are several possible explanations for this. The random script could be
in fact designed to select active blogs, in order to spare the user having to sift through inactive
blogs. Perhaps as a result of this ‘bias’ towards active journals, UK, Russian and Canadian blogs
appear to be over-represented. Noticeably, LJ was adopted only recently in those countries, which
makes it more likely that bloggers will be more active due to a “novelty” effect. Alternatively,
the random script might be programmed to output bloggers closer to the user’s location — the
UK, in our case.
The descriptive statistics of the sample are given below:
Variables Mean Median St. dev Min Max obs
Friends 64.00 38 91.32 1 717 250
Friend of 70.06 34 120.23 1 746 203
Number of entries 391.82 199 526.81 0 4271 249
Comments received 1705.80 661 2923.73 0 19580 249
Comments posted 1973.37 768 2926.18 0 14447 249
Member 9.63 3 14.99 0 94 203
Community 9.06 3 12.92 0 79 251
Entries per day 0.45 0.335 0.40 0 2.51 246
Comments per post 4.31 2.85 5.17 0 44.06 246
Comments per friend 41.19 19.54 110.86 0 1615 248
Duration 767.57 734.50 474.58 1 2143 246
Reciprocity 0.029 -0.048 0.77 -2.15 6.53 202
Table 2: Summary Statistics.
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There is clear evidence that data are skewed: variables’ median value are always lower than
the mean. So, in what follows, the “typical” user is described by median values. (It is often
pointed out that the median offers a better description of the center of a distribution than the
mean when data are skewed, because it is robust to extreme values.) Our blogger lists 38 friends
(i.e. she reads the blogs of 38 LJ users) and, in turn, she is read by 34 bloggers (friendof ),
which highlights a considerable level of reciprocity. The number of comments made/received
is also remarkably balanced.11 The blogger follows, and is member of, 3 communities.12 She
created 199 entries (posts) since the blog’s inception. The blog’s lifetime, which is measured by
duration, the length of time between the creation of the blog and its last update, is 734 days (i.e.
more than 2 years). A new entry is typically added every three days (entries per day). Each post
receives approximately 3 comments (comments per post), whereas the blogger makes about 20
comments on the journals of each of her friends (comments per friend).13 So, these data evidence
bloggers’ considerable commitment, although the frequency of updating and the posting activity
varies greatly among users.
The variable named reciprocity measures the degree of asymmetry in the blogger’s network,
and is computed by taking the logarithm of the ratio of readers to friends, as follows:
(4) reciprocity = ln(friendsof/friends)
Such measure implies that, when reciprocity is zero, the number of friends equals the number of
readers (in other words, the blogger’s network is symmetric). Any departure from zero indicates
some asymmetry in the network of the blogger. Furthermore, movements from negative towards
zero or positive values indicates that the number of readers increases relatively to the number of
friends.
In view of their skewness, data have been transformed on the logarithm scale for performing
regression analysis. Computations have been carried out using the econometrics and statistical
softwares Stata and S-Plus.
Appendix A describes the variables in the dataset in greater detail.
4.3 Results
This section studies the relationship among bloggers’ activity, number of readers and friends,
and reciprocity, using regression techniques. This is done to verify implications of the theoretical
model presented in section 3, namely hypothesis H1 and H2, which we recall below:
H1 Bloggers who display higher levels of content production and general blogging activity
have a higher number of readers.
H2 Bloggers with less/more friends than readers produce more/less content than others.
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To verify these hypotheses, we estimate a set of activity equations in which the number of
readers and the ratio of readers to friends are regressed on various measures of bloggers’ effort
(activity). The measures, or proxies, of bloggers’ activity are:
1. The length of time the blog has been active.
2. The number of posts the blogger has been making per day.
3. How long ago the blog was last updated.
4. The level of interactivity in the blog, as measured by how many comments are received
and posted in other bloggers’ journals.
5. The number of communities the blogger belongs to.
We consider that a blog that has been active for longer does evidence a higher level of com-
mitment. This first proxy, however, does not fully capture bloggers’ effort. Indeed, a blog that is
active for a long time and presents a low level of posting activity may be considered less active
than a blog that has been updated for a shorter amount of time but has been posting more actively.
Furthermore, inactivity may lead other bloggers to drop the blog from their list of friends. So,
the second and third proxy aims to capture these latter effects.
When considering the effect of blogs’ lifetime, one should also note that a blogger who has
been updating for a long time is likely to accumulate many friends, irrespective of his or her level
of activity. This because there is a high level of inertia in the friending process on LiveJournal:
LJers tend to keep a blogger on their list even long after that blogger has stopped updating, as
long as that blogger does not drop them. Indeed, most bloggers like to inflate their list of friends
and friend of and will maintain relations long after they have ceased being active.
Hypothesis H1 suggests that the measures listed above, as proxies for activity, should be
positively related to the number of readers. In this respect, however, one should note that the
effect of the number of community one belongs to looks ambiguous: a blogger involved in many
communities may have less (communities draw attention away from personal blogs) or more
readers (communities are a way to set up relations based on common interests).
Before estimating the activity equations, we analyse the relationship between number of blog-
gers which a user lists as friends (friends) and number of bloggers that list the same user as a
friend (friendsof ). This should give a preliminary idea of the structure — and degree of aggre-
gate reciprocity — in the network. To do so, we fit a simple regression model to blogs data, as
follows:
(5) ln( f riendso f ) = α+β ln( f riends)+u;
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Here, the response variable is the logarithm of friendsof, or readers, and the covariate is the
logarithm of the number of friends. Residuals and sensitivity analysis lead us to remove two
outlier observations.14 Table 3 presents regression estimates from the model:
ln(friendsof) se t−value P > |t|
ln(friends) 0.932∗∗∗ 0.034 27.14 0.000
constant 0.214 0.135 1.59 0.115
obs 200
RSS (df) 62.750 (198)
R2 0.789
F (1, 198) 736.41∗∗∗
BP 6.73 (0.0095)
RESET 0.87 (0.4569)
Table 3: Simple Regression
Legend: obs is number of observations; RSS is the residuals’ sum of squares; F is the F statistics for the
significance of the regression; BP is the Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity; RESET is Ramsey’s
test for the omission of relevant variables. (Test p-values are in parentheses.).
∗∗∗ : < 1%;∗∗ : < 5%;∗ : < 10%.
Those results suggest a strong relation between the two variables. The value of the coefficient
on friends is significant and close to 1, indicating that a (percentage) unit increase in the number
of friends induce a nearly 1% increase in the number of readers. The Breusch-Pagan (BP) test
rejects its null of constant variance in the model, evidencing the presence of heteroscedasticity
in the data, as it is often the case with individual observations; we thus report robust standard
errors.15
Figure 1 presents the scatterplot of the data and the fitted regression line:
Figure 1: Scatterplot of friendof versus friends and regression line.
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From hypothesis 1, agent (c), who has more friends than agent (a), should also be more
active, while from hypothesis 2, agent (d), who has the same number of friends but is read by
more people than agent (e), should also be more active. We will see in the following whether
network sizes and imbalances are indeed related in the way we hypothesize.
4.3.1 Testing the first hypothesis
In what follows, we regress the numbers of readers (friendof ) on several indicators of bloggers’
activity. The model is as follows:
ln( f riendso f ) = α+β1 ln(member)+β2 ln(entries)+β3 ln(comments)+β4 ln(commade)+
+β5 ln(duration)+β7 active+ ε;(6)
here, member denotes the number of communities one is member of, entries the number of
entries per day, comments the number of (received) comments per post, commade the number of
comments posted per friend, and duration the duration (in days); finally, active is a dummy that
takes value one when the blog has been updated in the last 8 weeks (prior to the data collection
date) and zero otherwise. All variables are in natural logs.
Table 4 presents results for the regression of equation 6.
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Dependent variable: ln(friendsof)
ln(member) 0.140∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.045) (0.036) (0.035)
ln(entries) 0.390∗∗∗ 0.395∗∗∗ 0.414∗∗∗ 0.417∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.074) (0.068) (0.071)
ln(comments per post) 0.766∗∗∗ 0.767∗∗∗ 0.758∗∗∗ 0.758∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.060) (0.048) (0.048)
ln(comments −0.271∗∗∗ −0.272∗∗∗ −0.440∗∗∗ −0.440∗∗∗
per friend) (0.052) (0.060) (0.055) (0.056)
active 0.061 0.028
(0.152) (0.013)
ln(duration) 0.537∗∗∗ 0.547∗∗∗ 0.613∗∗∗ 0.618∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.046) (0.048) (0.048)
reciprocity 0.656∗∗∗ 0.657∗∗∗
(0.094) (0.096)
constant 0.351 0.340 0.304 0.298
(0.303) (0.301) (0.248) (0.273)
obs 141 141 141 141
RSS (df) 36.04 (134) 36.10 (135) 25.87 (133) 25.88 (134)
R2ad j 0.755 0.756 0.832 0.824
F stat 73.00∗∗∗ 88.06∗∗∗ 101.90∗∗∗ 102.45∗∗∗
BP 22.41 (0.001) 16.40 (0.006) 47.95 (0.000) 39.32 (0.000)
RESET 2.76 (0.001) 2.70 (0.001) 2.05 (0.012) 2.06 (0.012)
Table 4: Multiple regression.
Legend: robust standard errors are in parentheses; p-values for BP, RESET in parentheses.
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One can see that all coefficients are significant, with the exception of the dummy variable
for activity. A possible explanation for this, is that a blogger with no entries in the last 8 weeks
may be very active in communities or in commenting on other people’s entries. As noted at the
beginning of this section, the LJ inertia makes us reluctant to label any account as ‘inactive’.
So, we re-estimate the model without the dummy. Results for this regression are reported in the
second column of table 4. The exclusion of the dummy does not worsen the overall fit of the
model, and changes only marginally the value of the coefficients, without altering signs.
The chosen measures of activity have a positive and statistically significant effect on the num-
ber of readers. In particular, the largest coefficients are associated with the number of comments
per post and duration: a 1% increase in these variables lead, respectively, to about a 0.8% and
a 0.5% increase in the number of readers, cæteris paribus. Smaller, but positive and significant
effects are those of the number of entries and the number of communities the blogger belongs to.
Otherwise, an increase in the number of comments posted induces a reduction in the number of
readers.
Measures of goodness-of-fit suggest the model is quite successful at describing the data:
the R2 shows that the equation explains a great proportion of the variation in friendsof, and the
F statistic (F stat) for the overall significance of the regression rejects the null that the slope
coefficients are jointly zero at any conventional level of significance. There is, however, some
evidence of heteroscedasticity in residuals, as shown by the Breusch-Pagan (BP) test statistic,
and the value of the RESET test suggests misspecification in the model.
Figure 2 reports partial effects of the model’s covariates on the dependent variable (or added-
variable plots). These plots link the response variable to each regressor, emphasising the contribu-
tion of each covariate to the model, in isolation from the others; so, they are useful in evidencing
departures from linearity/normality and outlying values.16 By looking at the graphs, one can
notice the good fit produced by the measures related to posting activities. Other covariates have
more dispersed observations, highlighting the heterogeneity in the data.
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Figure 2: Multiple regression model: partial effects without reciprocity as an independent vari-
able.
Before estimating the second activity equation, there is an additional effect that should be
taken into account. Bloggers who maintain a balance between friends and friends of are not
regarded by other bloggers in the same way as bloggers who do not maintain that balance. No-
tably, bloggers are deterred from friending those bloggers who have more readers than friends,
because the chances of reciprocation are low. Similarly, bloggers with more friends than readers
may give the impression they do not require reciprocation and may thus end up reinforcing the
imbalance. This is why we expect most blogs to have an equal number of friends than friends of
in the aggregate, since there is likely to be a stigma to not doing so. This motivates extending the
model of equation (6) to include reciprocity, which captures network imbalances, in the vector of
explanatory variable.
The third and fourth column of table 4 reports estimates of the activity equation with reci-
procity. Results shows that reciprocity has a positive and statistically significant effect on the
dependent variable. Controlling for the effect of reciprocity improves the overall goodness-of-fit
of the model. The value of the Breusch-Pagan test statistic, however, increases considerably, and
the partial effects plots in figure 3 casts several doubts on the explanatory power of the added
variable:
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Figure 3: Multiple regression model: partial effects with reciprocity as an independent variable.
4.3.2 Testing the second hypothesis
To examine the second hypothesis (H2), which relates content production and network imbal-
ances, we estimate a second equation, in which reciprocity is regressed on the various proxies
of activity listed in the beginning of this section. As already noted, reciprocity captures the im-
balance in the network, but also measures the number of readers relatively to the the number of
friends. This is relevant to the verification of hypothesis H2.17 The model is as follows:
reciprocity = α+β1 ln(member)+β2 ln(entries)+β3 ln(comments)+β4 ln(commade)+
+β5 ln(duration)+β7 active+ ε;(7)
(Here, explanatory variable are as in the model of equation 6.)
The estimated equations, for the models with an without the dummy variable, are given in
table 5 below:
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Dependent variable: reciprocity
ln(member) −0.069∗ −0.065∗
(0.084) (0.040)
ln(entries) −0.037 −0.033
(0.092) (0.042)
ln(comments per post) 0.012 0.013
(0.127) (0.052)
ln(comments 0.258∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗
per friend) (0.099) (0.050)
active 0.050
(0.252)
ln(duration) −0.116∗∗ −0.108∗∗
(0.090) (0.051)
constant 0.073 0.062
(0.299) (0.272)
obs 141 141
RSS (df) 23.612 (134) 62.84 (135)
R2ad j 0.267 0.271
F stat 9.52∗∗∗ 11.56∗∗∗
BP 43.94 (0.000) 37.20 (0.000)
RESET 2.15 (0.012) 2.10 (0.014)
Table 5: Multiple regression: reciprocity equation.
Legend: robust standard errors are in parentheses; p-values for BP, RESET in parentheses.
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The number of comments posted has the largest coefficient (in absolute value), followed by
duration. These coefficients, however, have opposite signs. An increase in the number of com-
ments posted leads to an increase in the number of readers/friends ratio. Conversely, an increase
in the blog’s lifetime is associated to a reduction in the same ratio. Community membership,
number of entries, and comments received, have small and scarcely significant coefficients.
The regression explains about 30% of the variation in the dependent variable, which is not
at all disappointing; it is indeed well known that R2s tend to be low when using individual data.
Once again, the Breusch-Pagan test rejects its null of constant variance at any significance level.
The F test statistic for the regression, however, decisively rejects the null of joint lack of signifi-
cance of the regressors.
In summary, results from this analysis show that there exist a positive and statistically sig-
nificant relation between level of activity and number of readers, confirming hypothesis (H1).
The evidence in favor of hypothesis (H2) is less favorable, but offers some interesting insights.
The variable comments per friends displays the most significant and largest effect on reciprocity.
Noticeably, this variable is mostly related to the level of blogs’ interactivity, in that it measures
the posting activity of the blogger in other users’ blogs, as opposed to indicators of mere activ-
ity (such as, for example, entries posted). This can be interpreted as evidence that willingness
to interact does affect network patterns, and increases number of readers relatively to number
of friends. Other variables do not have sizeable effects, whereas the life span of blogs, albeit
significant, has a negative effect.
In what follows, we attempt at combining information from the two activity equations by
specifying and estimating systems of regression equations. Furthermore, because reciprocity
enters the activity equations both as an explanatory and a dependent variable, we apply an In-
strumental Variable (IV) technique to the equation for the number of readers. Indeed, we have
argued that network imbalances may affect ‘friending’ patterns, and certainly, such variables are
both determined within the same network of relationships.
Before investigating the possibly endogenous effect of reciprocity, we estimate a SURE
model, in which reciprocity and number of readers are regressed on the same activity indica-
tors.
4.3.3 The SURE model
Here, we present results from the estimation of a seemingly unrelated regression (SURE) model.
SURE (Zellner, 1962) is an attractive estimation method, in that it allows us to exploit information
in the DGP of the error terms to improve the efficiency of the OLS estimates. This is done by
allowing the error terms in the equations to be correlated. Results from the estimate of the system
of equations is shown in table 6 below:
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Dependent variable: ln(friendsof) reciprocity
ln(member) 0.144∗∗∗ −0.065∗∗
(0.039) (0.031)
ln(entries) 0.395∗∗∗ −0.033
(0.048) (0.038)
ln(comments per post) 0.767∗∗∗ 0.013
(0.055) (0.044)
ln(comments −0.272∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗
per friend) (0.035) (0.044)
ln(duration) 0.547∗∗∗ −0.108∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.041)
constant 0.339 0.062
(0.286) (0.231)
obs 141 141
R2ad j 0.765 0.291
F stat (χ2) 459.89∗∗∗ 59.78∗∗∗
BP (χ2(1)) 39.903 (0.000)
corr 0.532
Table 6: SURE.
Legend: Standard errors are in parentheses; BP is the Breusch-Pagan test for independence (p-values in
parentheses); corr is the off-diagonal term in the correlation matrix of residuals.
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Here, as we expect, the estimated coefficients are the same as in the separate OLS regressions
presented in the previous section. Interestingly, however, a sizeable correlation appears in the
variance-covariance matrix of the residuals – The only covariance term is displayed in the bottom
line of table 6. Indeed, some efficiency gain appears to be confirmed by lower estimated standard
errors than those reported for the OLS equations. Parameters of community membership and
duration are now more significant than in the single equation model for reciprocity. The Breusch-
Pagan test for the diagonality of the variance matrix decisively rejects its null of independence of
these residual series. In view of the fact that both equations have the same regressors, this seems
to indicate that there is indeed some “common factor”, perhaps unobservable, which affects both
reciprocity and the number of readers and is omitted by the model.
The validity of the SURE method is based on the condition that no dependent variable should
enter one of the other equations in the system as an explanatory variable. When estimating the
first activity equation, however, we found that reciprocity has a significant effect on the number
of ‘friends of’. So, in what follows, we attempt at combining information from the two activity
equations in a manner that allow reciprocity and number of friends to be simultaneously deter-
mined.
4.3.4 Instrumental Variable Estimation
This section looks at the problem of the suspected endogeneity of the reciprocity measure by
estimating an equation for the number of readers where reciprocity is “instrumented” by the
measures of bloggers’ activity. This allow us to test for the endogeneity of reciprocity, and to
treat is as an exogenous variable in the model of the number of readers.
Table 7 below presents results from the estimation of such model, fitted by 2 Stage Least
Squares (2SLS), where the explanatory variable reciprocity is “instrumented” by measures of
activity:
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ln(friendsof) IV OLS
ln(member) 0.075 0.123∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.046)
ln(entries) 0.359∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗
(0.094) (0 .057)
ln(comments 0.781∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗
per post) (0.104) (0.060)
ln(comments (instrument)
per friends)
ln(duration) 0.432∗∗∗ 0.373∗∗∗
(0.073) (0 .094)
reciprocity −1.061∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗
(0.391) (0.117)
constant 0.405 0.637
(0.482) (0.634)
obs 141 141
R2 0.375 0.700
Wald χ2 154.73∗∗∗ 49.96∗∗∗
Hausman test 15.05∗∗ (0.010)
Table 7: IV regression: model estimates and comparison with OLS regression.
Legend: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Identification is achieved by excluding comments per friend from the regression.18 Haus-
man’s test statistics rejects its null of exogeneity of reciprocity at the 1% significance level. So,
there is some indication that OLS estimation yields inconsistent results, supporting the adequacy
of the IV procedure. IV coefficients are slightly higher than those produced by the correspond-
ing OLS regression (these are reported in the second column of table 7, for comparison). The
variable member, however, is no longer significant. Noticeably, reciprocity enters the activity
equation with an elasticity greater than 1, and its effect is now negative in sign. Results from the
IV estimation using Generalised Method of Moments (GMM), which produces consistent and
efficient estimates when errors are non-iid, yields identical results.
Interestingly, these results are consistent with bloggers attaching a ‘stigma’ to network imbal-
ances. Indeed, the negative sign of reciprocity implies that when the number of readers increases,
relatively to the number of bloggers who are befriended, the number of readers decreases. In
future work, we will examine whether it is the degree of symmetry in the bloggers’ networks that
influences the number of readers (networks that are more symmetric are more attractive, while
asymmetries in any direction tend to be stigmatized), or whether bloggers simply prefer befriend-
ing a blogger who has less friend of compared to friends because those bloggers then can devote
more attention to themselves.
24
4.4 Robustness analysis
To examine the robustness of our conclusions, we have considered different versions of the ac-
tivity equations estimated in sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2. In particular, we have replaced the vari-
able member with two different measures of bloggers’ involvement in communities: the variable
community, which measures the number of communities read by a blogger, and a dummy which
takes value zero when the subject does not read or belong to any community. Tables 8 and 9,
in Appendix C, present estimates from the fitting of the activity equations with, respectively, the
variable community and the dummy in place of member. Results provide clear evidence that sig-
nificant activity effects come out as robust results. Magnitude, sign and significance of individual
coefficients do not change substantially in those models, compared to the original ones. The same
conclusions are achieved when re-estimating the first activity equations using IV regression. In
particular, reciprocity maintain its significant and negative effect. Furthermore, results do not
change when inactive blogs are excluded from the analysis.19
To check for the correct specification of the functional form, and examine possible ‘kinks’ in
the response to changes in activity, the original models have also been fitted using a non-linear
version of the multiple regression equations 6 and 7, namely a generalised additive framework
(GAM). This works by fitting non-linear, non-parametric, components in addition to linear terms.
Non-linear components, however, are not significant, supporting the linear specification of the
models.20
5 Conclusion
This paper analysed patterns of relationship and content production among bloggers from a theo-
retical and empirical perspective. The analysis has identified statistically significant relationships
between network size, structure of the network, and content production using real data. In partic-
ular, levels of content production and blogging activity have been found to be related to the size
of and level of imbalance in the network of relationships in which a blogger is inscribed.
Future work will be based on the collection of data over several periods in order for example
to determine which comes first: having many readers or producing a lot of content. We will also
be exploring more general functional forms for the utility an agent derives from belonging to a
network of bloggers. We hope this will allow us to define some flexible formula relating attention
given and received at the aggregate level for each agent. We will also be collecting additional data
on the type of relationship entertained between bloggers on LiveJournal, notably on reciprocation
of friendship at the individual level. We will also exploit data that identifies the most popular LJ
users based on their Google rank, a score Google attributes to websites depending on the number
of websites they are linked from.
Another interesting extension to this study is to measure not only quantity but quality of
content. This would enable us to distinguish between a vast majority of blogs that are only of
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‘local’ interest for their friends and a minority of blogs whose content (and audience?) evidences
a level of achievement of the blogger in his/her chosen topic. We would also like to consider
whether bloggers might not have different ‘ethos’; for example, some bloggers will be very
careful with and will attach a lot of meaning to friending when this means letting access to
screened, more personal entries. Some others will consider their list of friend as a reading list,
devoid of any further meaning. Obviously, those two types of bloggers may display the same
level of activity and yet have widely different number of friends. This type of difference in
‘ethos’ is not something that we can capture with our measures, but it could be proxied by the
level of imbalances in bloggers’ networks. Finally, there is valuable work to do exploiting data
on communities on LJ, and the way they federate agents around themes without their members
necessarily establishing direct links.
Notes
1This expression of net surplus does not take account of the fact that additional attention by a new friend will
lead the blogger to increase his own activity, thus also leading in an increase in his cost. Similarly, the new friend
will herself increase her own activity. This expression therefore considers only the short term benefit of establishing
a new link. The long term benefit depend on the result of a whole chain of reaction and counter-reaction to the
establishment of this new friendship. For a full model, see appendix E.
2On LiveJournal, agents can put some of their friends on special filters, allowing them to read those friends’
entries separate from others, and also to post entries available only to those friends. However, the use of such tools
requires a certain degree of sophistication, and their use is usually not publicized by the blogger for fear of alienating
others.
3Other blog hosts include Google’s Blogger and WordPress. Blogging features are also offered in social net-
working sites such as MySpace and Facebook, but these are not widely used.
4More information on LJ and its history can be found on its Wikipedia entry, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/livejournal.
5Source: www.livejournal.com/stats.bml (accessed on 13 December 2005).
6www.deadjournal.com
7Users can provide additional information in the “bio”, a space where bloggers present their profiles.
8Users have the option not to reveal their gender, an option that is taken by about a third of users.
9http://www.livejournal.com/random.bml
10Source: http://www.livejournal.com/stats.bml.
11Note, however, that “comments posted” includes comments posted in communities, while “comments received”
includes only comments made on the user’s journal. This implies that, on average, a blogger will have received more
comments than she makes on another’s blog.
12Member denotes the number of communities one is member of, whereas Community is the number of commu-
nities read by the blogger; this distinction is relevant here because a blogger cannot post in a community unless she
is a member of that community, but she can follow a community’s debate without being a member.
13Comments per post are those comments received by the blogger, averaged by the number of posts, whereas
comments per friend are comments made by the blogger in other blogs, and averaged by the number of friends.
14This is performed by computing squared-residuals and a measure of leverage associated to the data-points. The
observations removed are the 109th and 223nd. These bloggers presents the highest difference between the number
of friends and friendsof in the sample, with just one blogger listed as a friend.
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15Robust standard errors are computed using the option robust in Stata, which implements the sandwich
estimator proposed by Huber and White.
16In practice, added variable plots present residuals from a regression of the covariate x j on the set of remaining
covariates in the model (the vector X− j) versus residuals of the regression of X− j on y, the response; in doing so,
they extract the genuine contribution of each explanatory variable to the model.
17It should be noted that the effects of the activity variables on the degree of asymmetry of the network, in the
context of this linear regression model, is ambiguous. For example, a positive sign in an estimated coefficients indi-
cates that the ratio friendsof/friends increases when the value of the variable associated to that coefficients increases.
It does not say, however, whether the network becomes more or less asymmetric.
18Results of the Sargan’s over-identifying restriction test does not support the inclusion of further instruments.
19Results for IV regressions and active-only blogs are not reported for reasons of space. They are available form
the author on request.
20Additive models (Hastie and Tibshirani, 1990) are flexible regression frameworks, which allow departures from
linearity while preserving the additive structure of a standard linear regression model. Non-linear components are
non-parametric in the sense that functional forms are not specified and the components are fitted by non-parametric
algorithms, such as kernels or splines. As a result, they provide an ideal setting to explore functional forms of
relationship among variables of interests, and can be used for checking regression models. Results are available
from the authors upon request.
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A Data Description
A.1 Original data
• User: User name (pseudonym)
• Location: Region and /or country where the blogger is based. 1 if Australia; 2 if Canada;
3 if Czech Republic; 4 if India; 5 if Philippines; 6 if Russian Republic; 7 if Scotland; 8 if
Singapore; 9 if Sweden; 10 if UK; 11 if US.
• Birth date: Blogger’s date of birth
• Friends: Number and list of weblogs read by the blogger. Limited to other blogs on LJ.
• Friend of: List of those bloggers with an account on LJ who read one’s weblog
• Mutual friends: A subgroup of ‘friend of’ : Number and list of those bloggers whose
friendship is reciprocated. This statistic is not provided as a default and must be activated
by the user.
• Also friend of: A subgroup of ‘friend of’ : number and list of those bloggers whose friend-
ship is not reciprocated. Note that Friend of = Mutual friends + Also friend of
• Communities: Number and list of communities the blogger reads. Communities are blogs
with a specific theme to which all members can contribute posts and comments.
• Syndicated accounts: Number and list of those weblogs not on LiveJournal that are read
by the blogger via LJ
• Member of: Number and list of the communities one is member of. Differs from ‘commu-
nities’ in that one can read a community without being a member of it (but one generally
cannot contribute if one is not a member).
• Posting access: Differs from ‘member of’ in that one can be a member of a community but
not have access to posting there.
• Account type: 1 if ‘free’; 2 if ‘paid’; 3 if ‘early adopter’. ‘Early adopter’ are the first
few members of LJ. There are also some ‘permanent accounts’, paid for life, grouped with
‘paid’. The introduction of ‘sponsored accounts’ with advertising was made subsequent to
our data collection.
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• Date created: Date on which the weblog was created.
• Date updated: Last date on which the weblog was updated (i.e. an entry was posted).
• Journal entries: Number of posts written since the weblog was created
• Comments posted: Number of comments made on entries made in other weblogs or com-
munities.
• Comments received: Number of comments received from other bloggers or in response to
them on one’s own entries.
A.2 Processed data:
• Age: Age of the blogger
• Days since creation: Difference between date of data collection and date of creation of the
blog (in days).
• Days since update: Difference between date of data collection and date of the last update
(days).
• Duration: Difference between date of creation and date of last update (days).
• Active: 1 if weblog was updated less than 8 weeks ago, 0 otherwise.
• Entries per day: Number of journal entries divided by duration
• Comments per post: Comments received divided by number of posts
• Reciprocity: Friend of divided by friends, expressed in logarithm.
B Figures
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Figure 4: Number of hosted weblogs created between 2000 and 2005.
Source: Perseus, The Blogging Geyser, available at: http://www.perseus.com/blogsurvey/geyser.html (ac-
cessed 04 January 2006).
C Robustness analysis
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Dependent variable: ln(friendsof) ln(friendsof) reciprocity
ln(community) 0.082∗ 0.112∗∗∗ −0.045
(0.048) (0.042) (0.033)
ln(entries) 0.414∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗ −0.039
(0.085) (0.085) (0.035)
ln(comments per post) 0.781∗∗∗ 0.757∗∗∗ 0.036
(0.065) (0.060) (0.055)
ln(comments −0.247∗∗∗ −0.402∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗
per friend) (0.068) (0.057) (0.047)
active 0.194 0.095 0.151
(0.155) (0.142) (0.104)
ln(duration) 0.546∗∗∗ 0.626∗∗∗ −0.122∗∗
(0.057) (0.053) (0.055)
reciprocity 0.658∗∗∗
(0.097)
constant 0.191 0.221 -0.046
(0.326) (0.300) (0.280)
obs 153 153 153
RSS (df) 47.484 (146) 35.640 (146) 27.325 (146)
R2ad j 0.701 0.774 0.303
F stat 58.66∗∗∗ 70.27∗∗∗ 6.75∗∗∗
BP 33.81 (0.000) 86.25 (0.000) 3.86 (0.695)
RESET 2.00 (0.019) 1.73 (0.042) 1.63 (0.074)
Table 8: Multiple regression: robustness analysis (I). Model with logarithm of community.
Legend: robust standard errors are in parentheses; p-values for BP, RESET in parentheses.
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Dependent variable: ln(friendsof) ln(friendsof) reciprocity
community 0.277∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗ 0.127
(0.104) (0.095) (0.089)
ln(entries) 0.441∗∗∗ 0.488∗∗∗ -0.088
(0.066) (0.068) (0.042)
ln(comments per post) 0.819∗∗∗ 0.820∗∗∗ -0.001
(0.054) (0.044) (0.047)
ln(comments −0.233∗∗∗ −0.382∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗
per friend) (0.053) (0.054) (0.045)
active 0.105 0.080 0.049
(0.128) (0.118) (0.114)
ln(duration) 0.560∗∗∗ 0.640∗∗∗ −0.153∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.049) (0.042)
reciprocity 0.523∗∗∗
(0.086)
constant 0.053 0.089 -0.069
(0.300) (0.285) (0.217)
obs 191 191 191
RSS (df) 58.139 (184) 46.862 (183) 41.129 (184)
R2ad j 0.755 0.801 0.318
F stat 105.39∗∗∗ 112.57∗∗∗ 9.06∗∗∗
BP 33.52 (0.000) 62.53 (0.000) 17.47 (0.007)
RESET 2.01 (0.026) 1.25 (0.243) 2.30 (0.009)
Table 9: Multiple regression: robustness analysis (II). Model with dummy community.
Legend: robust standard errors are in parentheses; p-values for BP, RESET in parentheses.
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D SURE
Table 10 presents results on the estimation of the two equation for friends and friends of in the
same system, to gather information on the data generating processes of number of readers and
number of friends. Notably, the correlation between the error terms of the two equations is high
and significant.
Dependent variable: ln(friendsof) ln(friends)
ln(member) 0.144∗∗∗ −0.210∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.034)
ln(entries) 0.395∗∗∗ −0.428∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.042)
ln(comments per post) 0.767∗∗∗ 0.753∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.049)
ln(comments −0.272∗∗∗ −0.528∗∗∗
per friend) (0.035) (0.039)
ln(duration) 0.547∗∗∗ 0.655∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.045)
constant 0.339 0.276
(0.286) (0.254)
obs 141 141
R2ad j 0.765 0.815
F stat (χ2) 459.89∗∗∗ 623.17∗∗∗
BP χ2(1) = 57.585 (0.000)
corr 0.640
Table 10: SURE.
Legend: standard errors are in parentheses; BP is the Breusch-Pagan test for independence (p-values in
parentheses).
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E Solving a full model of reciprocal attention
In this appendix, we consider a full model of reciprocal attention. The model we present below,
while accounting for a diversity of motivations for agents in the network, allow us to examine
how these different motivations translate into different outcomes.
Consider a simple model with three agents who produce their own content and read content
generated by others in the network. We call ‘Friends of i’ the agents that are read by i. e =
(ei,e j,ek) denotes the vector of effort into producing content by agents i, j and k respectively.
n=(ni j)i6= j denotes the vector of attentions. (Agent i devotes attention ni j to the content produced
by j 6= i.)
A simple additive form for the total utility of an agent, i in this instance, is
(8) Ui(n,e) = λi∑
j 6=i
n jiei︸ ︷︷ ︸
Utility from being read
− 1
2
e2i︸︷︷︸
Cost of producing content
+ ∑
j 6=i
ni je j︸ ︷︷ ︸
Utility from reading others
with λi ≥ 0. λi measures the propensity to enjoy being read compared to the propensity to enjoy
reading others (normalized to 1 here). There is no cost to reading others (the cost of reading
content produced by others is likely to be negligible compared to the cost of producing such
content).
Each agent faces a time budget Ki in the attention they can devote to others, so that for
example i faces constraint ∑
j 6=i
ni j ≤ Ki.
We assume an agent decides first on how much effort e she will put into writing. This de-
termines her schedule of effort as a function of the attention she expects to be given to her. In a
second stage, the agent decides on how much attention n she will allocate to others. She knows
by backward induction how this will affect their effort in the first stage21. The Nash equilibrium
of this two stage game is such that the vector of attention in the second stage corresponds to what
was anticipated in the first stage when effort was made, and no agent wishes to deviate from the
equilibrium schedule (e,n) of effort and attention.
In what follows we consider two polar cases:
A In the first case, λi = λ j = λk ≡ λ and Ki = K j = Kk ≡ K : agents have the same level of
motivation between reading and writing and they all have the same time budget.
B In the second case, λi = λ j ≡ λ and λk = 0 while Ki = 0 and K j = Kk ≡ K : agent i is
a ‘writer’, that is, she has no interest and thus no time for reading others. Agent k is a
‘reader’, that is, she derives no utility from being read but has got time to read others.
Agent j is a reader/writer who derives utility from writing but also has time for others.
We show that symmetric agents devote equal attention to each members of their network and
produce the same amount of content (case A). The impact of asymmetries in agents’ motivations
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is also analysed (case B), which leads us to postulate the existence of a norm of reciprocity. We
show that, if the norm of reciprocity is such that a link between an agent i and an agent j is
established only if it results in i gaining as much as j from the establishment of the relationship,
then an agent i that has few friends will link with an agent j who has more friends only if that
agent j offers more content than what agent i offers.
A) Let us consider a network where all agents are motivated the same way, that is, λi = λ j =
λk ≡ λ and Ki = K j = Kk ≡ K.
Proposition 1 The unique equilibrium of the game of reciprocal attention with three symmetric
agents is such that each agent produces effort e = λK and devotes attention n = K2 to each of the
other agents.
Proof. In appendix F
Each agent thus allocates half of its time budget to each of the other agents, and produces the
same effort; she also devotes the same level of attention to each other agent as those other agents
devote to itself: ni j = n ji.
Generalising from the above, it is possible to show that in a network with n agents with time
budget K then each agent will devote attention Kn−1 to every other agent and will produce effort
λK. Each agent derives utility λ (1 + 12λ )K
2 from participating in the network irrespective of
its size. As the network size grows, each agent has less time to devote to other agents but their
overall attention remains constant. Since the agent produces content in proportion of the sum of
attention she gets, content is invariant with the number of friends. This leads us to spell out the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 If bloggers are all identical, then bloggers’ total effort devoted to writing and
interacting with other agents does not depend on the number of readers or friends they have
(H1’).
Note however the limitations in the setting in which H1’, which is the converse of H1, can be
expected to hold:
1. All agents are supposed to be linked with each other. This will obviously not be the case
in a network such as LiveJournal where several million bloggers are present. However,
several studies (references) show a ‘small world’ effect in blogging networks, with small
networks of heavily interlinked individuals (high in-degrees) with little links with other
networks (small out-degrees). If all agents belong to such ‘small worlds’, then the model
tells us that their effort should be invariant with the size of the network they belong to.
2. All agents devote the same time budget to blogging. There is little way for us to check this
is the case, though it is possible to some extent to proxy time budget with age.
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3. All agents are motivated the same way. We will see in the following what happens if agents
respond to different motivations.
4. There are no network economies of scale, whereby for example agents would benefit from
the diversity of content provided by their friends or would learn to better manage their
relations or be more effective in producing content as their network size grows.
One should also note how counter-intuitive proposition 1 appears to be. Contrary to a com-
petitive model where agents try to accumulate more friends (and influence and/or prestige) by
producing more writing and interacting heavily with each other, this model assumes that agents
know they are part of a system which subsistence depends on them devoting as much attention to
others as is devoted to them. This contributes to limit any asymmetries between agents.
B) Consider now the asymmetric network whereby λi = λ j ≡ λ and λk = 0 while Ki = 0
and K j = Kk ≡ K. The reason to posit that an agent that enjoys being read (high λ ) will devote
less attention to others (low K ) is that this agent will devote a lot of effort to writing which will
give her less time to devote attention to others. Obviously, this is not necessarily the case, and
one could very well argue that λ and K would increase together, for example because a blogger
would get inspiration from reading others. However, it is still interesting for our purpose, which
is to illustrate the dynamics of networks of bloggers, to look at the above case.
Proposition 2 The reader (agent k) produces no content and devotes most of her attention to the
reader/writer (agent j). The writer (agent i) devotes no attention to others and produces more
content than all others. The reader/writer (agent j) devotes all her attention to the writer (agent
i) and produces a moderate amount of content.
Proof. In appendix G
The above findings are summarised in table 11.
Attention
given
Attention
received Effort Friends Friend of ln
Friend of
Friends
Writer (i)
0 to j
0 to k
K by j
1
4K by k
5
4K 0 2 ∞
Reader/Writer ( j)
K to i
0 to k
0 by i
3
4K by k
3
4K 1 1 0
Reader (k)
1
4K to i
3
4K to j
0 by i
0 by j 0 2 0 −∞
Table 11: Attention and effort in an asymmetric network
From table11, one can see that, in an unbalanced network with varying representative motiva-
tions, the presence of a writer reduces the total amount of content produced in the network even
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the writer himself produces more content than in a balanced network. The presence of a reader
contributes to re-balancing somewhat the network, as she allocates more of her attention to the
reader/writer than to the writer. This effect comes about not because the reader/writer pays any
attention to the reader, but because the reader wants to encourage the reader/writer to produce
content, knowing that the writer produces content anyway since she gets the whole attention of
the reader/writer.
In the table, we assume that the number of friends of an agent is the number of agents she
pays attention to, and the number of friend of is the number of agents that pay attention to her.
From the table, there would be a positive correlation between how unbalanced an agent’s network
is (proxied by ln Friend ofFriends ) and how much content is produced by that agent, and there would also
be a positive correlation between how many readers (friend of) one has and how much content
one produces.
F Proof of proposition 1
Consider agent i ’s decision in the first stage. She is maximizing her objective function U(n,e)
with respect to ei.Denote e∗i her optimal choice of effort. From the first order conditions of her
maximization problem we obtain
(9) e∗i = λ∑
j 6=i
n ji
This means that the agent will produce content in proportion to the total attention she expects
to receive. More content is produced as λ , which measures the level of utility from being read,
increases.
Consider now agent i ’s decision in the second stage. She maximizes her objective function
U(n,e∗) with respect to ni., the attention she devotes to others, s.t. the constraint ∑
j 6=i
ni j ≤ K. The
Lagrangian of this maximization problem is
(10) λ∑
j 6=i
n jie∗i +∑
j 6=i
ni je∗j −
1
2
e∗2i −ν(∑
j 6=i
ni j−K)
which agent i maximizes w.r.t. to both terms in ni. : ni j and nik. Replacing e∗i with their expression
in (9) and taking the first derivative of the above expression, we obtain the following first order
conditions of the maximization problem:
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λ (2ni j +nk j)−ν = 0(11)
λ (2nik +n jk)−ν = 0(12)
ni j +nik = K(13)
Replicating the same FOC for j and k, we obtain the following system of equation
2ni j +nk j = 2nik +n jk(14)
2nki +n ji = 2nk j +ni j(15)
2n jk +nik = 2n ji +nki(16)
ni j +nik = K(17)
nki +nk j = K(18)
n jk +n ji = K(19)
This is a system of six equations with six unknowns, which is solved for
(20) n∗i j = n
∗
ik = n
∗
ki = n
∗
ji = n
∗
k j = n
∗
jk =
K
2
Putting this back in (9) we conclude that
(21) e∗i = e
∗
j = e
∗
k = λK
Each agent derives utility λ (1+ 12λ )K
2 from their participation in the network.
G Proof of proposition 2
In the first stage, both i and j will produce content in proportion to the attention they will receive
from others, while agent k (the reader), will produce no content, so
e∗i = λ∑
j 6=i
n ji(22)
e∗j = λ∑
i6= j
ni j(23)
e∗k = 0(24)
Consider now agent i ’s decision in the second stage. Agent i will devote no attention to others
since her time budget is 0, so ni j = nik = 0.
Agent j will maximizes her objective function U j(n,e∗) with respect to n j., the attention she
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devotes to others, s.t. the constraint ∑
i6= j
n ji ≤ K. The Lagrangian of this maximization problem is
(25)
1
2
λ 2n2k j +n jiλ (n ji +nki)−ν(n ji +n jk−K)
which agent j maximizes w.r.t. to n ji and n jk. This results in j optimally setting n ji = K and
n jk = 0; there is no point devoting attention to k since k produces no content.
Agent j will maximizes her objective function Uk(n,e∗) with respect to nk., the attention she
devotes to others, s.t. the constraint ∑
i6=k
nki ≤ K. The Lagrangian of this maximization problem is
(26) nkiλ (n ji +nki)+nk jλ (ni j +nk j)−ν(nki +nk j−K)
which agent k maximizes w.r.t. to nki and nk j. This results in the following system of two equa-
tions:
λ (n ji +2nki) = λ (ni j +2nk j)(27)
nki +nk j = K(28)
Knowing from the above that n ji = K and ni j = 0, one obtains that nk j = 34K and nki =
1
4K. k
devotes more attention to j than to i in order to encourage production by j and thus better balance
content produced across the agents she reads.
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